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THE GERMAN ARMY,

WITH PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS—1848 TO 1889.

BY KARL BLIND.

I.

THESE summer months form an ever-memorable anniversary in the tragic history of the German movement for freedom and union. Full forty years have now elapsed since a prolonged and most sanguinary struggle took place; regular army fighting against regular army in those days of turmoil. It was the struggle between the men who still stood true to the popular cause as represented by the rump of the National Parliament and by Democratic risings on the one hand, and the Royalist forces on the other, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, the later Emperor-King William I.

Under the national and democratic banner were ranged the troops of the expelled Baden dynasty, who had gone over to the side of the Revolution, together with a number of militia and volunteer regiments. On the side of political reaction—counting the Prussian forces as well as those of the Executive at Frankfort—there was an overwhelming Royalist army, more than three times larger, composed of nearly 80,000 men. Yet it took several months, and a series of battles in the open field, before the popular cause was vanquished. The sequel of the princely victory was a court-martialling of prisoners of war, extending over several months, and a reign of terror which drove more men into exile than ever fled from Poland or France after an unsuccessful rising or a but too successful state-stroke.

I will not recount here the details of the upheaval of 1848-'49, which shook the thrones of the Fatherland. Only, to give an idea of the original depth and strength of the revolutionary current, it may be brought to recollection that one of the first acts of the National Assembly at Frankfort was to declare the "Sovereignty of the Nation," and that this was done under the initiative of its Speaker, Baron Heinrich von Gagern, otherwise a moderate Constitutionalist, a man of an old, aristocratic family. The whole of Germany, including our then federal provinces of

Austria, was represented in that Assembly. The deputies of Schleswig-Holstein also had answered to the trumpet-call of the nation. In the previous Provisional Parliament, in April, 1848, Dr. Welcker, the aged champion of constitutional monarchy, had proposed a bill, in the name of the so-called Committee of Seven, of which Gagern was a member, which was not less significant. According to it, all Germany was to have :

(1) A Chief of the Confederacy, with responsible ministers.

(2) A Senate, composed of representatives of the various States of the Confederacy.

(3) A People's House, formed by direct elections.

There was to be one army for all Germany ; one diplomatic representation abroad ; one system of commerce, of navigation laws, of entrance duties, of coinage, measure, and weight, of postal and water conveyance and railways ; also unity in civil and criminal law and in judicial procedure ; a Federal High Court of Justice and a National Bill of Rights. The remarkable thing in this proposition was the entire omission of the word "Monarchy." It was omitted from no lack of monarchical sentiments, but because, in the excited state of public opinion, it was thought prudent to refrain for a while from mentioning Princes. Ultra-reactionists therefore said the bill of these Moderates might as well have been applied to the establishment of a kingless Commonwealth.

On their part, the Republicans, officered by Friedrich Hecker and Gustav von Struve,—both of whom in later years fought as exiles in America on the side of the Union,—proposed at Frankfort the establishment of "United States of Germany." Their bill began with the abolition of standing armies and the creation of a national militia. The introduction of a progressive income-tax ; the formation of a Ministry of Labor ; the promotion of the co-operative principle, and similar measures were to benefit the working classes. The last paragraph ran thus : "Abolition of the hereditary-monarchical form of government, and substitution for it of freely-elected legislatures, at whose head freely-elected Presidents are placed—all united in a Federal Constitution, on the example of the North American States."

II.

"One army" was the cry of the monarchical Constitutionalists, but they did not define the nature of its composition. A

national militia, on the Swiss model, was the demand of the Republicans. The Swiss system entails compulsory service upon all able-bodied men. In Germany universal liability for such service had until then—and the same remained the case for years afterwards—only existed in Prussia, where it had been decreed in 1814, after the first overthrow of Napoleon.

In the remainder of the German States, the Conscription was in existence. This institution is in England often confounded with the universal service (*allgemeine Wehrpflicht*) of all able-bodied men. Even English officers sometimes speak rather loosely in this sense. In truth, the two systems are very different. Under the one, the peer and the peasant, the burgher, the workman, and the scholar are all drafted into the army. Under the Conscription, lots had to be drawn as to who was to serve in a comparatively small, but numerically fixed, army establishment. Any one who had drawn an "unlucky number" could, if he had the pecuniary means, furnish a substitute willing to become a soldier in his place. So it was also in France up to a recent time.

Overbearing conduct of officers—mostly of aristocratic descent in the higher ranks—and harsh treatment of privates were, in the days preceding the German Revolution, but too often the characteristics of army life. In a time of long peace—unbroken from 1815 to '48—absurd pipe-clay and martinet customs had sprung up. For the mass of the privates there was thus often cause for complaint; but the inexperience of youth and the terrors of the military code rendered it almost impossible for any voice of remonstrance to make itself heard. In this respect, the Revolution brought with it a decided and lasting improvement.

There is another point which must not be forgotten. It is the pride which men are apt to feel when once dressed in the warrior's garb—the contempt they are easily led into against others who are not. This pride in a particular kind of dress often degenerates even—especially among troops got together by conscription or enlistment—into hostile jealousy and bloody conflict between men of the several branches of the army; aye, between differently-clad regiments belonging to the same division of arms.

Of all this I had curious personal experience before 1848. Some of us had for some years before felt strangely hopeful forebodings of coming great events. It was as if a ray of the rising New Era had touched the brow of the younger generation. As

students at the University, we had worked with pen and speech, in public or in confidential conclave, establishing small but active political circles among artisans, citizens, younger men of the merchant class, and members of the Gymnastic Associations, in which the ideas of national freedom and union began strongly to pulsate. It struck me then that, in view of possible future conflicts, the most urgent necessity was to gain a footing within the army itself. It was with considerable difficulty that this was effected at Karlsruhe and in neighboring garrisons ; the worst difficulty being at first to make artillery consort with infantry or dragoons, or the latter between themselves. By degrees, though very slowly, we succeeded, nevertheless. Equally difficult it was, in the beginning, to make men of different classes and callings meet soldiers in some out-of-the-way place in the country where the police would not be engaged in spying. Still, when the Revolution came, the spirit which had thus been working for a time in secret soon manifested itself with quickly increasing strength.

III.

It is a significant fact that throughout Germany, in the early part of the national rising, the army was either compelled, after a sanguinary struggle, to withdraw, or was not available at all for upholding a system hated by the mass of the people. When Frederick William IV., in March, 1848, was virtually defeated in the streets of his capital, and the then Crown Prince driven to seek safety in England, the anger of the Court circles and of the aristocratic officers became indescribable at what they regarded as a dishonor for the army—namely, the King's order to the troops to leave Berlin. However, in the war against Denmark the Prussian army soon obtained an opportunity of gaining better laurels than it possibly could by the destruction of the nation's hopes for freedom and union. Only the King, later on, secretly counteracted the deliverance of Schleswig-Holstein, which had been achieved by military victories, and so those German populations were still kept under foreign dominion until 1863.

Meanwhile, the Army question had come up at Frankfort in the Provisional Parliament of April, 1848. Jakob Venedey, but recently returned from exile, yet holding very moderate views, made the only practical proposal which could have saved the national cause. His counsel was, unfortunately, not heeded. He was in

the habit of taking his cue from English parliamentary history, from the days of John Hampden; and he very reasonably suggested that, first and foremost, the German National Assembly should form a parliamentary army. His brother-Constitutionalists, being of the academic and professional persuasion, did not see their way to such an effective measure. So the princely armies remained as they were, and though afterwards, when Archduke John of Austria had been elected by the Assembly as Regent of the Empire, all German troops were nominally placed under the command of the executive which had issued from Parliament, the arrangement soon proved a broken reed.

This was first shown in the war against Denmark. The German troops had penetrated as far Jutland when, all at once, the order came from Berlin for a retreat. Frederick William IV. regarded the Schleswig-Holsteiners as "Republican rebels"! Under Russian and English influence, the armistice of Malmö was signed—an act branded by the German masses as downright treachery, and looked upon with disgust by the troops themselves. Yet, by a narrow majority, the National Assembly, from fear of a rupture with the Prussian Government, was brought to accede to this hateful armistice. Had there been a parliamentary army, things would have gone differently indeed. In the absence of such power, the fatal step was made; and immediately afterward barricades were raised at Frankfort and the streets ran with blood. In the turmoil of the strife, atrocities were committed on both sides at which Humanity veiled its face.

These events of September, 1848, had a tremendous echo all over Germany. A rising immediately followed in the Black Forest, under the banner of the German Commonwealth. So uncertain was the Baden Government of the spirit of its own soldiers that troops from Würtemberg, the two Hesses, and Prussia were drafted into the country. Again, as in April, 1848, our Republican rising was defeated; but the defeat bore in it the germ of a coming victory; for, eight months later, nearly the whole Baden army itself rose in defence of the threatened National Assembly, tearing the grand-ducal symbols from its helmets and gathering round the Democratic standard.

IV.

The misfortune during the German Revolution was that Frankfort, Berlin, and Vienna had each a parliamentary centre of

its own : a National Assembly at Frankfort, a Constituent Assembly in the Prussian, a Reichstag in the Austrian, capital. The revolutionary forces were thus scattered, driven in contrary, often clashing, directions. A single Assembly and a single parliamentary army would have given safety, whether the issue had been a United Empire or a Commonwealth.

As it was, Vienna, after nearly a month's siege, was taken by the Imperialist army of Windischgrätz and Jellachich. A system of terror followed, under which Robert Blum and other friends of freedom were martyred. The overthrow of Vienna emboldened the Court camarilla at Berlin to a state-stroke. Prussian troops, chafing under the remembrance of their retreat from Berlin in March, 1848, and nettled because their victories against Denmark had been rendered fruitless, allowed themselves to be made into tools of oppression. Reasonably speaking, they ought to have done the contrary. But soldiers, when feeling that their glory has been tarnished, are apt to act in a very inconsequential way.

Berlin being got under, the rising at Dresden, in May, 1849, when a provisional government was installed and the dynasty had to fly to the fortress of Königstein, was also suppressed by Prussian troops. Yet such had been the impetus of the popular spirit that men like Richard Wagner and Gottfried Semper, Germany's foremost architect, joined this revolution in Saxony, where formerly they had held Court and Government appointments. Then Rhenish Bavaria rose, and simultaneously, in the Grand-Duchy of Baden a complete military revolution was effected—the first and only instance of this kind in Europe, outside of Spain.

Enormous was the effect of this event. It would lead too far to describe the causes which led to the downfall of the promising movement, to unroll the picture of the battles fought in June and July, 1849, or of the court-martial fusillades which followed, lasting until the end of October. In the midst of the strife, the German Parliament, which had transported its seat to Stuttgart, was dispersed by force of arms. The reactionary victory was finished up by wholesale arrests to such an extent that all prisons and all disposable strong-rooms of the Grand-Duchy did not suffice to hold the captives, whilst the mass of refugees was so enormous that, twelve years afterwards, this part of Germany had not re-attained a population as large as it had possessed before 1849!

During these harrowing events it often came out that the

hearts of the Prussian *Landwehr*—that is, of the older men who had experience of civil and political life—were far more open to sympathy with popular rights than the younger soldiers, particularly those from the more backward country districts. When quartered in the houses of burghers and peasants, *Landwehr* men not rarely gave proof of Liberal inclination. But when cannon roared and the sharpshooters lay in ambush, when the cavalry charge roused the blood of the combatants, such kindly feelings were of no avail. Then brethren in mind and aspirations had to kill each other, and the freedom of the Fatherland received deadly wounds.

V.

In the dreary years of oppression which followed this national tragedy, the spirit of the army, more especially of the Prussian officers, did certainly not improve. Too often the citizens had to complain of overbearing conduct, of high-handed lawlessness, leading to scenes of bloodshed in the streets and in public localities. Within the ranks of the army itself dissatisfaction was frequently rife, in consequence of harsh treatment. Still, a counter-agent always existed there in the fact of men of all classes—the wealthiest and most highly-educated, together with the poorest—serving in the same regiment. Where officers and non-commissioned officers have to deal with such a body of men, they generally feel bound to use a certain caution, lest any misconduct of theirs should be brought home to them, owing to the social connection of a number of soldiers.

The body of officers in Prussia was in those days even more largely composed of members of the old and new nobility than it is now. From the detailed official list of the present year, it appears that among the generals of the infantry and the cavalry there is still not a single man with a commoner's name. Among the lieutenant-generals there are only seven (that is, 8 per cent.) who bear no aristocratic title. Among the major-generals there are but thirty-three commoners; that is, 25 per cent. Among the colonels, there are ninety-nine such; that is, 37 per cent. The aristocratic or nobilized element thus prevails most exceedingly. But if we only go back to the three previous years, we find things even worse. In 1888 there were but 5 per cent. of commoners among the lieutenant-generals. In 1886 only 15 per cent. were

non-aristocratic among the major-generals. In the same year the proportion of commoners among the colonels was but 28 per cent.

Among regiments of the Guard (Grenadiers, Riflemen, etc.), there are now a number without any officer of simple civic name. The same is the case with the great majority of the cavalry regiments of the Guard. Of late there has also been a renewed slight increase of aristocratic officers among lieutenant-colonels, majors, and officers of the staff. Still, upon the whole, there is a decided improvement in comparison with the former state of affairs.

The second war for the deliverance of Schleswig-Holstein fortunately brought out the nobler qualities of the German army. Prussians and Austrians fought, in 1863-'64, side by side, not heeding the danger of possible Russian, English, and French interference, and the victory was quickly assured. The heart of the mass of the nation was in the war. In fact, the Governments of Berlin and Vienna, who at first hung back, were forced into it by the general enthusiasm which threatened the reluctant Courts with a revolutionary rising. Of this serious condition of affairs I can speak with confidence, having at the time been in close connection with a number of prominent leaders and active German patriots both in Schleswig-Holstein and in Germany at large—at Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, and elsewhere.

Then followed the "fratricidal war" of 1866. Its attained object was to establish Prussian leadership over a section of the German Confederacy; Austria being altogether ejected, whilst the smaller states of the South were left in an intermediate position. As a fratricidal war (*Bruderkrieg*) Prince Bismarck himself has repeatedly described it, in recent years, in the Reichstag. The extreme riskiness of the venture has also been acknowledged by him in most graphic terms, referring to his own personal safety in case of failure. On both sides German armies in 1866 displayed the greatest bravery—Austrians, Saxons, Bavarians, Württembergers, Badeners, Hessians, Hanoverians, on the one hand; Prussians on the other. But Austria, having at the same time to fight in front, as well as in the rear against the Italians, whilst her regiments from still dissatisfied Hungary were but half reliable, could not make headway against the needle-guns of the solid and superior military organization of Prussia and the tactical genius of Moltke. So the allies of Austria from the smaller states were beaten in detail.

Within a fortnight Prussia had mobilized 500,000 men. Far more behind in putting their forces in the field were Austria and other members of the German Confederacy. Years before, the Prussian Government, in open conflict with its own House of Commons, had insisted on a reorganization of the army, which the representatives of the people had cause to think would be made use of for crippling Constitutional liberties. The Prussian mobilization effected in 1859—when Napoleon III. made war on the Mincio with an eye to a future war on the Rhine—had impressed specialists of every political color with the necessity of army reform. At the same time there was much apprehension lest a King who so openly proclaimed his ideas of “right divine,” and who had so fiercely fought against national freedom in 1848-’49, should wish to prepare for himself an instrument of absolutistic rule. Hence that Constitutional conflict in which the majority of the Prussian House of Deputies, pointing to “Strafford and Charles I.,” rejected one Government proposal after the other.

It is a matter of notoriety how the Crown and its Minister took no heed of this parliamentary resistance. The proposed change from a two-years’ to a three-years’ service was forced through. Government effected its army reorganization in a lawless manner, levying taxes without the grant of a Budget. When the day for the assault upon the Confederacy came, the army reorganization thus forcibly wrought certainly stood the Crown in good stead. Still, here again the characteristic spectacle occurred of not a few regiments of the *Landwehr* showing a mutinous spirit. In many cases they at first refused to don their uniforms for what they regarded as a war among brethren. They had to be forced into compliance by regular troops of the line; the latter having in some instances to be called out to make the *Landwehr* enter the railway carriages which were to bring them to the seat of war. True, when they arrived there, they, too, fought splendidly, though with sore hearts.

It was fortunate that the war of 1866 was so quickly ended, or else France might have suddenly dashed in, and Germany once more have become the arena for contending foreign armies—as has been so often the case since the Thirty-Years’ War, whenever Germans stood against Germans. It was so in that terrible strife of 1612-’48, which brought about a break, not quite healed even now, in the history and the culture of the Fatherland. Again,

foreign armies, French and Russian, rushed in in the Seven-Years' War, when Frederick II. of Prussia laid the foundations of Prussian leadership in the North against the political connection of the German Empire under Kaisers of Habsburg origin. At the time of Napoleon I., when Prussia and Austria fell out among themselves, foreign dominion and extinction of national unity became complete until the great national revival in 1813.

In the war of 1866, the Prussian Government, before commencing operations, had actually to give a sort of pledge to France, by denuding the Rhine provinces of their proper fortress defence in the way of guns. In the midst of Prussian victories, Napoleon III. insisted on the notorious Paragraph V. being inserted in the Peace treaty of Prag, according to which the northern portion of Schleswig might be handed back to Denmark under certain conditions. This clause was received with much anger by the German nation—so much so that the Austrian Government, when again entering into relations of friendship with Prussia, released the latter from that particular treaty obligation.

It is sad to think that in France even men of the Republican party thought the time had come, in and after 1866, to exact from the Prussian King a territorial indemnification on account of the aggrandizement of his dominions. The German nation was to lose her western frontier, because it had engaged in an internal contest ! The greatest living poet of France, he who had so long opposed “Napoleon the Little,” Victor Hugo—whose ancestors were patriotic German Lorrainers—upheld this strange indemnification theory. More than once I had, in those years, an unhappy experience of aggressive military spirit among French Republican friends in exile ; the exceptions to it being but too few.

No better proof can be given of the remarkable hopes formed by Frenchmen in consequence of the German fratricidal war of 1866 than a despatch written immediately afterwards by Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. de Lavalette. In it he declared that whenever France—at the time the German Bund was still in existence—should have a difficulty with Holland (on account of Luxemburg), or with Prussia on the Mosel, or with German states on the Rhine, or with Austria in the Tirol, the united armed forces of the Confederacy would come into the field. But since Austria had been ejected, and Germany at large divided into three parts, this danger, Lavalette said, had

disappeared. The condition of affairs brought about by the war of 1866 he described as *les trois tronçons*. He imagined Germany would henceforth be nothing but "three mutilated stumps," with each of which France could deal separately, in order to annex Luxemburg, the Rhinelands, and even to get an entrance into Germany through the Tirolese mountain gorge.

VI.

These high-flown hopes were doomed to disappointment. Deep was certainly the estrangement between the North and South of Germany immediately after 1866. Napoleon fancied that, if some day he were to attack Prussia, he might make a rapid push into the smaller Southern states, gain them over to his banners, entice the Austrian army at the same time to advance against Prussia—aye, even reckon, in that contingency, upon the coöperation of Italy and Denmark. Agents of his in Germany kept on informing him that the bitterness of the feeling against Prussian aggression in 1866 was such in the South that, if war were to come, he might count on neutrality, even coöperation, there. The only military agent of France who saw things in clearer light was Colonel Stoffel, a man whose name shows him to be a descendant from the German race or of Alsace-Lorraine origin. His warnings, however, remained unheeded.

In the years between 1866 and 1870 nothing was left undone for perfecting military organization both in Prussia and in the smaller German states. The Governments of the latter—as came out afterwards—were secretly bound to Prussia by military conventions. When war broke out, an attempt was made by the ultramontane section of the Bavarian Chamber—fortified by some men of Liberal views whom the events of 1866 had hopelessly embittered and betrayed into unpatriotic conduct—to carry a resolution in favor of armed neutrality. This treacherous move was quickly put down by the national enthusiasm of the masses.

I had occasion, in that tremendous crisis, when trying to counteract the bad teaching of some who had formerly been our party friends, to observe the havoc wrought by the war of 1866 in the consciences of a group of once highly patriotic men. But these were solitary instances of deplorable infatuation. They were only to be taken note of, and firmly combated, in so far as the leanings of some of these groups might, in case of a first doubtful issue, have had an injurious effect on the great national cause.

Meanwhile the grand and noble spirit of the nation carried everything before it. The southern Germans refused to make a "stab at the heart" of their brethren in the north, with whom but four years before they had had to cross swords. They would not do to Prussia as the Prussian Government formerly had done to them. Badenese, Würtembergers, Bavarians, Saxons, Hessians, Hanoverians, fought as stoutly as the Prussians themselves. The first important victories were in a large measure owing to the South German contingents under the Prussian Crown Prince.

Though the former Austrian section of the German army was no longer available, in consequence of the political exclusion of the southeastern part of the Fatherland from the remainder, the military triumph of the forces of two-thirds of the whilom Confederacy over the attempted French aggression was such as is unexampled in history. The lauded *mitrailleuse* was of no avail to the enemy. The Turcos, the Zouaves, went down like bogies. Before the iron firmness of an armed nation strong in the consciousness of right, and led by a strategist as bold as he is calm and far-seeing, one French host after the other was defeated, in spite of occasionally most stout or even heroic resistance. No such spectacle of utter defeat has been seen since men engaged in war.

In these struggles, not only the bravery, but also the regular orderliness, the good general information, and the resourceful intelligence of the average German soldier were much remarked. Whilst French officers were often in hopeless ignorance as to the geography of their own country, educated French people in whose houses German troops were quartered, were amazed at the evidence of instruction in the common soldier of that nationality, even if he did not come from the classes in which that might naturally be expected. The linguistic accomplishments of these "outer barbarians" was also something to marvel at; seeing that that branch of knowledge was until then so much neglected in France. To the French officer, his own Alsatian or Lorraine compatriot was, as a rule, the only medium for understanding German. In the German army, on the contrary, a great many men could converse with the French in their own tongue. Occasionally a puzzle arose in matters of language. One day, on the field of battle, apparently the diary of some German soldier was found, written in an alphabet no one in the French camp was able to read. The important document was sent to headquarters;

but there, again, there was nobody to make out what it contained. The strange letters were held to be a secret cipher. The document itself was supposed to be the report of the inevitable "Prussian spy." So the paper was once more sent on—this time to Paris. At last it came out that a German soldier, who happened to be one of the seven or eight Sanskrit scholars who served during that campaign, had amused himself with writing a report of the previous engagement in the sacred ancient language of India. To think that a chance bullet should possibly make an end of the store of knowledge in such a brain is melancholy indeed. Yet these men also cheerfully did their patriotic duty.

VII.

A glance at the chapter entitled "Scientific Requirements for the Examination of Ensigns," in the *Deutsche Heer- und Wehrbuch*, gives a good idea of the high standard prescribed for those purposes in the German army. The number of one-year volunteers who, by passing an examination of no mean difficulty, are entitled to that short service in times of peace, is a considerable one. Hard as the universal service, no doubt, presses upon the mass of the nation, a single paragraph of the Army Rules shows what notions of honor are connected with it. In an army got together by enlistment, like the English, the privates, in some cases, have in former times been jail-birds or of otherwise tainted character, whilst the officers were gentlemen of high social standing. Matters have considerably improved of late years as regards the privates; but still such cases occur. Now, in the German army a man who has been sentenced to imprisonment in a house of correction for a common crime is excluded from military service. That is his privilege, but it is one which marks him as infamous.

"Every German is obliged to serve in the army, and cannot be represented by another in the exercise of that duty." This is the maxim laid down in the first chapter of the military organization. The only persons freed from that obligation are the members of the reigning princely families and of those once sovereign, but now mediatized, houses of the older German Empire, to whom this exception is guaranteed by treaty. It may, however, be said that at least a number even of those princely personages did not, in the late war, avail themselves of the exception. For all German citizens the liability to service lasts from the com-

pleted seventeenth to the completed forty-second year. Of this time three years are to be spent in active service in the standing army. Four years the soldier remains in the Reserve. After that he passes for five years into the *Landwehr* and into the supplementary Reserve. This makes altogether twelve years. Subsequently he remains liable, in extreme cases, for the *Landsturm*, or last levy, which, as a rule, is not to be sent abroad, but only to be used for home defence, as garrisons of fortresses and so forth. In dress and arms no homogeneousness is prescribed for the *Landsturm*; but when led against the enemy, the men are to be made recognizable by certain military accoutrements.

By the new law, owing to the recent threatening aspect of the European situation in the East and the West, the standing army of Germany has been brought up to upwards of 500,000 men—or 550,000, if the men on leave, liable to immediate recall, are added. In case of war, this body can be brought up, by calling in the first Reserves, to upwards of 1,050,000 men. For operative purposes a further addition of upwards of 1,310,000 men may be made through the *Landwehr*. If the supplementary Reserve is put on its legs, this would give a further force of 1,465,000. Total, in round numbers, 3,800,000 men. But if the *Landsturm* also were called out, nearly 6,500,000 men would be under arms!

The prospect is a saddening one. At Germany's eastern flank, however, Russia professes to be able to raise an army of 10,000,000 men. On Germany's western flank, France may call out more than 4,000,000. Being between two Powers of historically aggressive character, Germany cannot disarm before the others do, though the heaviness of the armor presses on her most weightily. It is for her a question of national existence or extinction.

All the more desirable would it be that the French Republic—established through German victories—should devote itself to internal peaceful progress, so as to alleviate the menacing aspect of affairs, and to make it possible for the champions of international friendship to resist effectively the spread of mere militarism. Unfortunately, the Boulanger craze, against which but recently a firm stand has been made by Government and Parliament, has given little hope for such a consummation; and until this would-be revival of a demagogic Cæsarism is finally put down and really rooted out, Europe will continue, even in the midst of peace and of an Industrial Exhibition, darkly to resound with the threatening clangor of arms.

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